The distinction between fear and anguish in paragraph 40 of Sein und Zeit is well known. Fear has an object, whereas anguish has none. In fear, there is a being in the world, a something in a corner of the world, say a beast, that represents a danger, a threat. It comes nearer, and the Dasein has fear. By contrast, anguish has no object inside the world. What is before anguish is completely indeterminate. Danger is nowhere. Anguish does not even know about what it is anxious. Literally, it is nothing. It is nothing in the world, because it is the world as such, or our being in the world. Anguish places the Dasein before the world as such, a world which then appears radically foreign and where the Dasein is always alone and completely free. Thus, anguish reveals the original being of the Dasein, which is capable of taking care of the world as such.

The Dasein flees its anguish in all kinds of activities: distractions as Pascal would say. Fear is one form of distraction. The cause of fear is the anguish that is always with the Dasein but, in fear, the anguish finds an object, which may be there, or not. Fear is a way to forget the anguish, and hide ourselves from ourselves, try and forget our entire being. Of course, there are other distractions, like talk, work, sports, which may be much more pleasant.

Is it actually possible to feel this indeterminate anguish? Of course, there is a sort of fear which does not relate to a definite danger, real or imaginary. The question, however, is whether this fear without apparent object is really indeterminate, or whether it has a hidden object, which, as Lacan has phrased it, is behind the fear rather than before the fear, suppressing as it were, but always ready to come back in another form, in stories and dreams.

However, I propose to leave the question aside and simply ask the Heideggerian philosopher to step up on Pascal's plank. Probably the Heideggerian philosopher will feel fear at first (if he does not, we can always find for him an alternate situation which relates to his own personal phobias). We will measure the plank for him so that he knows that there is no real danger. His fear is really imaginary. It is hiding from him his true nature, which is anguish. Now, will he be able to work himself into reaching this objectless anguish or will he remain plagued with his vertigo?

Pascal's bet would be that he will not be able to reason with himself. I will not take a position. I will just wish my Heideggerian philosopher good luck and look for another therapy.

In fact, I will try another therapy which, though in a different sense, also makes fear objectless. James and Heidegger, though they have very different views of fear, would agree that the key feature from which fear must be theorized is that it can be objectless.