The fear of vermin, the fear of high places, of open places and broad streets – in what sense would phobia be “objectless”? In fact, James is arguing against an intellectual theory of emotion, according to which the perception of an object, say a dangerous beast, would produce a mental reaction (fear) which in turn induces certain bodily phenomena (cold sweat, difficulty breathing). James argues that the perception of the object immediately produces in the body certain changes, and that the feeling of these changes is the emotion. The difference is that there is no detour through the mind, and through judgement:

“If we abruptly see a dark moving form in the woods, our heart stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly, and before any articulate idea of danger can arise.” (Briefer Course, 376)

In fact, it is possible that at no point does the idea of danger, or even the image of the dark form, enter the field of consciousness. Our heart has stopped beating, our breathing is difficult, we are afraid, and we do not know what we are afraid of. Maybe we look around to see what has just scared us. Or we see a spider, a big hairy spider, but still relatively small compared to the size of our foot. We could crush it at once. There is no danger, but we are afraid nevertheless. In this sense, the morbid fear has no object: there is no object we need to be afraid of. Maybe we don't even find what we are afraid of. James is not speaking of the Heideggerian anguish, for the morbid fear has been triggered by something, which we may, or may not, be aware of, but which is present and whose effect on our nerves (even before the image has reached our consciousness) has set into motion all the bodily changes in which fear consists. In fact, in complete opposition with Heidegger's anguish, the “morbid fear” is wholly mechanical. It just depends on the effect of a certain image, or sound, or smell, which may not even enter our mind, on our body.

That is why the cure for these morbid fears is also wholly mechanical. One just needs to redress these corporeal symptoms that the Thing has caused and in what fear consists: take control of one's breathing, one's stature, and straighten them up:

“A friend [“the victim of what is known as morbid fear”] who has had occasional attacks of this most distressing of all maladies tells me that in his case the whole drama seems to centre about the region of the heart and respiratory apparatus, that his main effort during the attacks is to get control of his inspirations and to slow his heart, and that the moment he attains to breathing deeply and to holding himself erect, the dread, ipso facto, seems to depart.” (Briefer Course, 377)

Despite the fact that James is arguing against an intellectual theory of emotions, his views on phobias are similar to Descartes'. James would agree with Descartes that the mechanism of phobia is situated below the self, or the mind, and that there is no need to bring it to consciousness. Phobias need only to be cured mechanically by counteracting their mechanism on its very level: just breathe deeply and think of something reassuring; don't try to understand what it is going on.

James' therapy then bears the same defects as Descartes' behavioral therapy. The mind, which does not understand itself, remains enslaved, and the fearful object remains opaque, or darkened, suppressed: it cannot even be described in its fearfulness.